Citizenship - Account of activity during work experience Essay Example for Free

Citizenship Account of activity during work experience Essay My Citizenship coursework will be based on the rights and responsibilities of employees and their employers in the workplace. The aim of the coursework is to produce a report explaining the health and safety rules on my work experience placement. This is a citizenship activity because it looks closely at important rights. It will also look at my roles, and those of others, during the activity. I have chosen my work experience place because this will give me the opportunity to get an experience and will make me or introduce me to the world and get vital points on how to develop my life skills towards working. The placement that I have been given is not close to my house but I am willing to work hard and grab this opportunity. I am also interested in the financial market and promoting of products and Ill learn from this. I went for my work experience to Comet Stores. My work experience was for a two week period staring on the 6th of June 2005 and ending on the 16th of June 2005. The area that I was allocated for the work experience was in Fosse Park, which is near the outer ring of the city near to the motorways. Comet Stores is a well-known brand, which sells household electronic devices. The placement that I was in was the biggest store in the city. The complex comprised of two floors namely the sales floor (which was the first floor) and the warehouse, which was the second floor. Before attending the work placement I had to phone up and book an interview with the manager in charge of the store. A week after the phone call was the date of my interview. In the interview I was told the basics about the company such as start and finish times, the dress code and passwords to enter the staff room. I was told that at the first day of my work experience I would be told in more detail about my individual and team tasks. At the start of the first day of my work experience I was feeling anxious as well as nervous. This was the first time I would be entering a working environment. At the start of the day I was taken by the manager for an assembly. I was told to report to the designated area where each person would be given a briefing each morning. A gentleman named Chris was to look after me for the first day. He was in charge of the warehouse stock and was very helpful. He gave me some advice and told me many people have visited the store for work experience and that the store will challenge my ability individually and with a team. The manager had told Chris to take me to the boardroom where I was shown Health and Safety videos that were made by the store. After each key fact Chris would explain to me what it meant, how it concerned the store and asked me if I had any questions. I was also given additional leaflets on Health and safety in the building such as the fire exits and where the fire extinguishes were. I was given a wide range of activities during work experience. The main task I was given for the first few days was to pack and check the shelves. This consisted of me checking the availability of the stock, ordering the stock from the warehouse if it had run out and then packing the shelves with the item. I was also given the chance to analyze the security system of the work place and told how to alarm and disable the alarm system. I was put on my first test with this task, as I had to wire all the flat screen monitors in a sequence to alarm the security if any person may try to take the item. I had noticed as the days went on the store gave me different and more tasks to do which would challenge my ability. I was promoted to assisting the sales staff and to analyze the way in how the sales person would work. This task was to communicate with the public and gave a lot of confidence. I was also placed in the warehouse where I was given a lot of responsibility. I was asked to check the stock, the handling of goods, taking orders and also using the elevator belt, which I was given a Health and Safety guide to. The elevator belt could go upward towards the warehouse and when giving items to the sales floor going downwards. Special buttons were needed for this and great care was needed. All the staff members assisted me but as I was put on different jobs there was different staff members that would help me. As I was on the warehouse level the elevator belt had suddenly come to a halt. As I was not a technician I had asked from a member of staff from the warehouse level. He kindly came and tried to help me but could not fix the problem. As a result he sent a technician to come and assist. The problem was sorted and both members of staff assisted me when I asked for some help. Whilst on the placement I had learnt a lot about rights and responsibility of employers and their employees. I was given a sheet, which told me all the rights.

Pride and Prejudice :: Pride Prejudice Essays

Pride and Prejudice In fact, Pride and Prejudice was originally entitled First Impressions. However, the novel is not only about first impressions. Although we can find the first impressions about the characters through the first few chapters, this book shows us the effects of those impressions on the individual characters--prejudices of the characters. The story almost evenly describes the defects of Fitzwilliam Darcy who show "pride" at the beginning of the novel; he speaks carelessly and insultingly to Elizabeth Bennet, and George Wickham who deceives others on purpose and conceals his truthless character. Elizabeth misunderstood both of them at first because of her prejudice. At first I have assumed that the title of this novel alludes clearly to Darcy's "pride" and Elizabeth's "prejudice." I also thought that the novel tells how Darcy and Elizabath overcome their pride and prejudice. However, I realize that this over simplifies the author's purpose. We can certainly see that Elizabeth has "pride" as much as Darcy has. She is proud of her intelligence, comprehension and independence. Actually, Darcy's pride disappears quite a bit early in this novel. By chapter 6, he is starting to change his attitudes towards her. He is humbling himself to be close to her. This shows Darcy's change: "But no sooner had he made it to clear to himself and his friends that she had hardly a good feature in her face, than he began to find it was rendered uncommonly intelligent by the beautiful expression of her dark eye" (16 page) "He began to wish to know more of her, and as a step towards conversing with her himself, attended to her conversation with others." From this point, Darcy's prejudice against Elizabeth begins to fade while her prejudice towards him still remains because he refused to dance with her at the ball. Her prejudice spreads throughout the book, and that prejudice is an outcome of her wounded pride. The main subject of this novel is courtship and marriage. Jane Austen, the author of Pride and Prejudice, shows and indirectly criticizes the 18th century England's rural society and the pride of high class through several people's marriages who are in different social position.

Research Papers on Ready to Eat Food

CRISES Paul Krugman, January 2010 As this is formally billed on this program as the Nobel lecture, I suppose that I’m expected to focus on the work for which I was honored with the prize. And yet †¦ proud as I am of the work I and many others did on increasing-returns trade and economic geography, given what is happening in the world – and given what I’ve largely been working on these past dozen years – that work is not uppermost in my mind. Fortunately, there’s an out. The Nobel committee did cite another line of work that goes back to the first good paper I ever wrote: â€Å"A model of balance of payments crises†, published in 1979 but originally written while I was in still in grad school. When I’m in an expansive mood, I like to say that I invented currency crises – not the thing itself, which goes back to the invention of paper money, but the modern academic literature. And business has been good ever since. Now, most of what has gone wrong with the world these past two years has not taken the form of classic currency crises (though give it time – the Baltic nations, in particular, seem well positioned to follow in Argentina’s footsteps). But there are strong parallels between the kinds of crises we actually have been experiencing and what those of us in the currency crisis biz call â€Å"third-generation† crises. Both the similarities and the differences are, I think, illuminating. 1 So without further ado, let me launch into a discussion of currency crises, their relationship to financial crises in general, and what all of that tells us about current prospects. A history of violence The sudden implosion of world financial markets, trade, and industrial production in 2008 shocked many if not most economists. I think it’s fair to say, however, that international macroeconomists were less startled. That’s not to say that we predicted the crisis: speaking personally, I saw that we had a monstrous housing bubble and expected bad things as it deflated, but both the form and the scale of the collapse surprised me. What is true, however, is that international macroeconomists were aware, in a way those who focused mainly on domestic data were not, that the world economy has a history of violence. Drastic events – sudden speculative attacks that emerge out of a seemingly clear blue sky, abrupt economic implosions that slash real GDP by 5, 10, even 15 percent – are regular occurrences on the international scene. Let me illustrate the point with the figure below, which shows peak-to-trough declines in real GDP during â€Å"third generation† currency crises (a term I’ll explain in a little while). This list is close to, but not identical to, the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) list of banking crises: as R&R point out, crises often combine elements of several of their ideal types. What I’ve done in this case – in a poor man’s homage to Reinhart and Rogoff’s awesome data-collection effort – is scan the Total Economy Database for all cases of sharp GDP declines in high-and middle-income countries since 1950, then do some cursory historical research to ask whether they fit the profile of a third-generation crisis. 2 GDP declines in third-generation currency crises Mexico 1994 Korea 1997 Chile 1981 Malaysia 1997 Finland 1990 Thailand 1997 Indonesia 1997 Argentina 2002 5 10 15 20 A few observations: First of all, we’re talking huge declines here – Depression-level, in some cases. You can see why international macroeconomists were more attuned to the possibility of disaster than domestic macroeconomists: if you were looking only at US data, your idea of a really bad slump would be 1981-1982, when real GDP fell only 2. 3 percent. Second, if you know a bit about the history, you get a very strong sense of just how wrong conventional wisdom can be. Reinhart and Rogoff emphasize the â€Å"this time is different† syndrome, the way people wave off clear parallels to earlier crises. I’d go a bit further and argue that there’s a strong â€Å"pride goeth before a fall† syndrome. In many if not all of these cases, the country in question was everybody’s darling just before the disaster. Chile was a showpiece for Chicago School policies in action. I remember personally the enormous optimism about Mexico on the eve of the tequila crisis; I was very unpopular at a 1993 meeting of investors where I raised some questions about prospects. Argentina’s currency board was lionized by the Cato Institute, the Wall Street Journal editorial page, and so forth. The countries caught up in the East Asian crisis were the subject of glowing reports, including a major World Bank study. 3 After the fact, of course, everybody saw many flaws in each afflicted country’s economic model – just as everyone now sees the rottenness of the U. S. financial system, a system that was being praised just yesterday as one of the wonders of the world. Finally, note that half my examples are from the late-90s East Asian crisis. That crisis had a profound effect on some of us. Nouriel Roubini was transformed from a mild-mannered macroeconomist into Doctor Doom. I lost my faith in the healing powers of central bankers, and wrote the original edition of The Return of Depression Economics. In essence, the East Asian crisis awakened us to the fact that there were more dangers in the world economy than were dreamt of in textbook macro. But what were these dangers, anyway? Generat(ion)ing crisis All crises are divided into three parts. OK, maybe not. But the currency risis literature has evolved in three â€Å"generations†, successive accounts of what can cause sudden speculative attacks on currencies. First-generation models began, at least in my mind, with wise words from the governor of the Bank of Portugal. Back in 1976, a group of MIT graduate students was working at the Bank, thanks to a personal connection between the governor and Dick Eckaus. Portugal at the time was 4 a bit of a crazy place, still suffering from the mild chaos that followed the overthrow of the dictatorship the year before. The economy had stabilized after an initial slump, but the currency was under pressure, with reserves rapidly dwindling. It turned out later that most of the reserve loss was due to foreign exchange hoarding by commercial banks – which was kind of funny, since at the time those banks were state –owned. But in any case, the governor made a remark that intrigued me: â€Å"When I have six months of reserves,† he said, â€Å"I will have no reserves. † What he meant was that once reserves dropped below some critical level, there would be a run on the currency that would quickly exhaust whatever was left. There were already economic models like this, albeit of very recent vintage – and not exactly about foreign exchange. Notably, Salant and Henderson (1978, but circulated as a working paper in 1976), in an analysis of gold prices, devoted part of their paper to attempts to stabilize gold prices with stockpiles. They showed that an unsustainable stabilization scheme would eventually collapse in a speculative run that quickly exhausted the remaining stock, which is more or less what happened in March 1968. I realized that this was in effect what Silva Lopes had been saying about the escudo. Translating that insight into a fully-specified model was a bit tricky. Krugman (1979) was more complicated than it should have been; it took the work of Flood and Garber (1984) to get it in comprehensible form. But the result was a highly suggestive analysis of speculative attacks on fixed exchange rates. 5 But there were problems with that analysis. Some complained about the asymmetry between super smart speculators and super stupid governments. More compelling, in my view, was the fact that the story didn’t seem to fit very well with what actually happened in many currency crises, especially in advanced countries. For example, neither the sterling crisis of 1931 nor that of 1992 seemed to be mainly about dwindling foreign exchange reserves. Instead, both seemed to be about governments who found that their commitment to a fixed exchange rate was interfering with attempts to achieve domestic objectives, especially full employment. When speculators began to bet on an abandonment of the currency peg to deal with pressing domestic concerns, spiking interest rates sharply increased the cost of defending that peg – hence, a crisis, with speculators in effect forcing the government’s hand. In an influential survey of evidence from the 1992-1993 European crisis, of which the fall of sterling was one component, Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1995) coined the term â€Å"secondgeneration models† to describe models that tried to capture this quite different kind of crisis dynamics. The most influential modeling came from Obstfeld (1994), who showed that this kind of analysis strongly suggested the possibility of multiple equilibria: countries in a vulnerable state could experience a currency crisis whenever investors believed that such a crisis was imminent, or for that matter believed that other investors believed in a crisis. But two generations of crisis theory, it turned out, were not enough. Second-generation crisis models suggested that succumbing to a speculative attack should be good for employment and GDP: no longer constrained by the exchange rate commitment, a government would be free to 6 expand demand. That is, in fact, what happened in the aftermath of the two sterling crises, 60 years apart: I used to joke that Britain should erect a statue of George Soros in Trafalgar Square, to thank him for getting the UK out of the ERM. But it’s not what happened to Mexico after the tequila crisis, or the East Asian economies after the crises of 1997, or Argentina after the collapse of convertibility in 2002. In all these cases the collapse of a fixed rate under speculative attack was followed by a severe contraction in the real economy. Hence the development of third-generation models. These models – e. g. Krugman (1999), Aghion et al (2001), Chang and Velasco (1999) – emphasized private-sector balance sheets, especially firms or banks with foreign-currency debt. The key argument was that a currency depreciation set off by speculative attack would sharply worsen balance sheets, as the domesticcurrency value of foreign-currency debt rose. This in turn would damage the economy, e. g. by depressing investment, which would feed back into further currency depreciation, and so on. Some models stressed the possibility of multiple equilibria, but even without such multiplicity there was the clear possibility of disproportionate depreciation and output decline from an adverse shock, including the end of a bubble financed by foreign capital. Or to put it a different way, what happens in a third-generation currency crisis is a vicious circle of deleveraging. Hence the severe cost to the real economy. One question you might ask is whether this diagnosis is all ex-post rationalization. Did the theory of third-generation currency crises actually succeed in predicting any crises? The answer is yes: Argentina, which, alas, played out exactly as expected. 7 Before I proceed to the relationship between currency crises and the financial crises that have afflicted all of us recently, let me briefly ighlight two policy issues that arise in the context of third-generation crises. First, does this analysis argue that troubled economies with large foreign-currency debt should avoid currency depreciation? This is a highly relevant question right now for the Baltics, which, as I’ve already mentioned, are currently in a situation highly reminiscent of Argentina’s position just before the collapse. It might seem, given the a ccount I’ve just provided, that Latvia or Estonia should do anything possible to avoid devaluation. But that’s not right. Suppose that the underlying problem is a level of prices and wages that makes your production uncompetitive – typically the consequence of an earlier period of excessive capital inflows. Then what must happen, sooner or later, is a decline in prices and wages relative to those in your trading partners – a real depreciation. This can happen through nominal currency depreciation – but this has the unpleasant consequence that the real value of foreign currency debt will rise, creating a deleveraging crisis. Unfortunately, the alternative is worse. Real depreciation without nominal depreciation must take place through deflation. And this means that the real value of all debt, not just foreigncurrency debt, rises. So the deleveraging crisis will be even worse if you don’t depreciate. 8 A second issue concerns the role of capital mobility. Clearly, substantial capital mobility is a prerequisite for third-generation crises, which can’t happen unless you’ve already run up a large foreign-currency debt. And in the crisis, it’s capital flight that leads to the large depreciation that in turn worsens balance sheets. So there is a clear case for temporary capital controls – a sort of curfew on capital flight – in the heat of a third-generation currency crisis. But what does all this have to do with the current problems of the United States and other advanced countries? Deleveraging crises: similarities and differences In the movie The Longest Day there’s a scene involving a German general who is first shown preparing for a war game in which he will play the American commander. He tells his aide that he plans to surprise everyone by landing, not at Calais, but in Normandy – but not to worry, the Americans would never do that. Then, when the invasion begins, he mutters, â€Å"Normandy! How stupid of me! † Now you know how some of us felt as the current crisis unfolded. By 2006, huge U. S. urrent account deficits suggested that the dollar would have to fall eventually, and the fact that U. S. real interest rates weren’t significantly higher than rates in other major economies suggested that markets weren’t taking that fact into account. So there was reason to expect a Wile E. Coyote moment – a moment of sudden realization – leading to a 9 sudden dollar fall. But U. S. external debt, although large, is overwhelmingly dollar-denominated. So America didn’t seem vulnerable to a third-generation currency crisis. No worries, then, right? Yet the logic of the models should have suggested that there were, in fact, reasons to worry. After all, a vicious circle of deleveraging could arise as easily on the asset side as on the liability side, as noted in Krugman (2002). It should have been easy to put the evidence of a mammoth housing bubble together with the concepts of third-generation crisis theory to see how a nasty deleveraging cycle could occur without the â€Å"original sin† of dependence on foreign-currency debt. Sadly, almost nobody – certainly not yours truly – put the pieces together. Even those of us who diagnosed that housing bubble correctly failed to foresee the financial implosion that would follow. Normandy! How stupid of me! But now it has happened. How does the crisis we have actually stumbled into compare with a currency crisis, both in terms of outlook and in terms of the policy response? One difference one might have expected to be important is the role of monetary policy. The normal front line of defense against recession involves cutting interest rates. For a country facing a currency crisis, however, that defense is of ambiguous value: cutting rates may help domestic demand, but it may also weaken the currency, intensifying the vicious circle. For a country facing an asset-side deleveraging spiral, however, interest rate reductions are all good: in 10 addition to their usual effects, they support asset prices and help balance sheets. So you might have expected central banks to be very effective in fighting asset-price-driven deleveraging. In reality, however, the monetary line of defense was quickly overrun: reductions in policy rates quickly ran up against the zero lower bound, and that was that, at least as far as conventional monetary policy was concerned. We should have seen this coming: Krugman (2002) laid it all out, but nobody – the author included – took the message to heart. Meanwhile, there’s another difference between currency crises and asset-side crises that makes the latter look worse: namely, the fact that asset-price deflation, unlike currency depreciation, has no indirect stimulative effect on the economy. As Calvo et al (2006) have stressed, financial crises in emerging markets are often followed by â€Å"phoenix-like† recoveries, with the downturn giving way to very rapid growth. Key to these recoveries is the fact that a severely depreciated currency makes exports extremely competitive, leading to a large positive swing in the trade balance. As with the output declines associated with third-generation crises, the violence of these turnarounds is startling to economists accustomed to the tameness of U. S. data. The figure below shows the â€Å"current account reversal† for each of the cases shown at the beginning of this paper – that is, the extent of the swing from current account deficit on the eve of the crisis to the maximum current account surplus following the crisis. 1 Current account reversal as % of GDP 0 Mexico 1994 Korea 1997 Chile 1981 Malaysia 1997 Finland 1990 Thailand 1997 Indonesia 1997 Argentina 2002 5 10 15 20 25 These are awesomely large swings. In part, no doubt, they were due to the import-compressing effect of recession. But mostly they represent a gain in competitiveness due to plunging currencies. Plunging prices of house s and CDOs, unfortunately, don’t produce any corresponding macroeconomic silver lining. This suggests that we’re unlikely to see a phoenix-like recovery from the current slump. How long should recovery be expected to take? Well, there aren’t many useful historical models. But the example that comes closest to the situation facing the United States today is that of Japan after its late-80s bubble burst, leaving serious debt problems behind. And a maximum-likelihood estimate of how long it will take to recover, based on the Japanese example, is †¦ forever. OK, strictly speaking it’s 18 years, since that’s how long it has been since the Japanese bubble burst, and Japan has never really escaped from its deflationary trap. 2 This line of thought explains why I’m skeptical about the optimism that’s widespread right now about recovery prospects. The main argument behind this optimism seems to be that in the past, big downturns in the world’s major economies have been followed by fast recoveries. But past downturns had very different causes, and there’s no good reason to regard them as good precedents. Living in a crisis-ridden world Looking back at U. S. commentary on past currency crises, what’s striking is the combination of moralizing and complacency. Other countries had crises because they did it wrong; we weren’t going to have one because we do it right. As I’ve stressed, however, crises often – perhaps usually – happen to countries with great press. They’re only reclassified as sinners and deadbeats after things go wrong. And so it has proved for us, too. And despite the praise being handed out to those who helped us avoid the worst, we are not handling the crisis well: fiscal stimulus has been inadequate, financial support has contained the damage but not restored a healthy banking system. All indications are that we’re going to have seriously depressed output for years to come. It’s what I feared/predicted in that 2001 paper: â€Å"[I]ntellectually consistent solutions to a domestic financial crisis of this type, like solutions to a third-generation currency crisis, are likely to seem too radical to be implemented in practice. And partial measures are likely to fail. † 13 Maybe policymakers will become wiser in the future. Maybe financial reform will reduce the occurrence of crises: major financial crises were much rarer between the end of World War II and the rise of financial deregulation after 1980 than they were before or since. Meanwhile, however, the fact is that the economic world is a surprisingly dangerous place. REFERENCES Aghion, Philippe, Philippe Bacchetta, and Abhijit Banerjee, 2000, â€Å"Currency Crises and Monetary Policy with Credit Constraints† (unpublished; Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University). Chang, Roberto and Andres Velasco 1999, â€Å"Liquidity Crises in Emerging Markets: Theory and Policy,† NBER Working Paper No. 7272. Eichengreen, Barry, Rose, Andrew, Wyplosz, Charles and Dumas, Bernard, â€Å"Exchange Market Mayhem: The Antecedents and Aftermath of Speculative Attacks†, Economic Policy, October. Flood, Robert, and Peter Garber 1984, â€Å"Collapsing Exchange Rate Regimes: Some Linear Examples,† Journal of International Economics, Vol. 17, pp. 1–13. Krugman, Paul, 1979, â€Å"A Model of Balance of Payments Crises,† Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 11, pp. 311-325. Krugman, Paul, 1999, â€Å"Balance Sheets, The Transfer Problem, and Financial Crises,† in Flood, Robert, Isard, Peter, Razin, Assaf, and Rose, Andrew, eds. , International finance and financial crises: essays in honor of Robert P . Flood, Jr. , Kluwer. Krugman, Paul 2002, â€Å"Crises: the next generation† in Assaf Razin, Elhanan Helpman, and Efraim Sadka, eds. , Economic policy in the international economy: essays in honor of Assaf Razin, Cambridge. Obstfeld, Maurice; 1994, â€Å"The Logic of Currency Crises,† Cahiers Economiques et Monetaires, Bank of France, Vol. 43, pp. 189-213. Reinhart, Carmen and Rogoff, Kenneth 2009, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, Princeton. Salant, Stephen and Henderson, Dale 1978, â€Å"Market Anticipations of Government Policies and the Price of Gold†, Journal of Political Economy 14

The Between Landscape And Christianity - 2156 Words

Complex and deep metaphors aren’t the only way Burnett gets her message of healing and life lessons across. Themes such as magic, health and spirituality, The relationship between landscape and Christianity, well-being, and Companionship are presented as well. Throughout the book, Burnett writes statements such as â€Å"There is Magic in there.† (Burnett 281) and transforms the omnipresence of magic into a theme. Colin demonstrates an absolute engrossment in the garden and it teaches him about the meaning of life and the work of life; as the story progresses, he becomes certain that he is going to live to be a man, and proposes that he â€Å"will grow up to be a great scientist who makes discoveries about magic!† (Burnett 285-286). Of course, in reality the only kind of scientist that studies â€Å"magic† in these terms would be a Christian Scientist. All throughout the novel, Burnett heavily inflects the tenet of both Christian Science and New Thought ide ology. Burnett even goes on to define magic as a form of life force or a force of nature; it enables Colin stand, and the flowers to work out of the earth, etc. It is also aligned with the Christian God, as Colin sings the Doxology (a Christian hymn) to offer thanks to the â€Å"magic†. This Christian affiliation is strengthened in a plethora of ways than can be found all throughout the book; one such being Mrs. Sowerby s (Dickon and Martha’s mother) description of magic as a kind of creator, which is present in all things, and may haveShow MoreRelatedWestern And Northern Hemispheres On The European Continent Essay1558 Words   |  7 Pagessmall region, it is densely settled. There are four major landform regions found within Europe. Firstly, the European lowlands consist of a glaciated landscape with flat glacial lake beds. Examples of the European lowlands would be northern Germany, Poland, Estonia, and Holland. Secondly, the alpine mountain system is a glaciated mo untain landscape. 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